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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Benson Barrera appeals from a withheld judgment following a jury's guilty finding
on a charge of aggravated assault.

On appeal, he raises a number of claims,

specifically asserting that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict;
(2) the district court erred when it admitted 404(b) evidence that was irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial; (3) the jury was improperly instructed as to the requisite mental state
for aggravated assault; (4) the district court erred when it excluded, on relevance
grounds, a defense expert on head-butting; (5) even if each error set forth in claims two,
three, and four is individually harmless, together they constituted cumulative error
necessitating reversal; and (6) the prosecutor committed misconduct constituting
fundamental error when, during rebuttal closing argument, she personally attacked
defense counsel and impugned the role of defense counsel in our system of justice.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case arose out of an encounter between Benson Barrera and Juan Carlos
Ramirez.

As a result of that encounter, Mr. Barrera was charged with aggravated

assault. 1 (R., pp.229-30.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial, the relevant details of
which are recounted below.
The evidence established that Mr. Ramirez met Mr. Barrera as a result of
Mr. Ramirez's then-wife, Scarlet Ramirez, engc1ging in an extra-marital affair with

1

Mr. Barrera was initially charged with aggravated battery. (R., pp.65-68.) Later, after
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Ramirez suffered permanent disfigurement, the State amended the charge to what it
argued was the lesser-included charge of aggravated assault. (R., pp.156-57, pp.22930.)

1

Mr. Barrera.

Ms. Ramirez and Mr. Barrera met through their work at the Ada County

Courthouse, where she was a court clerk and he was a public defender. That affair,
which lasted "(o]ff and on for, maybe, five, six months," started one year before the
encounter giving rise to the charge in this case. Ms. Ramirez told her husband about
the affair shortly after it started, and they divorced shortly thereafter (Tr.,2 p.215, L.1 p.217, L.25, p.374, Ls.16-19.)
3

Mr. Ramirez testified that he first encountered Mr. Barrera in person about a
month after the divorce, when he confronted Mr. Barrera about the affair.

The

encounter became rather "heated," with Mr. Ramirez "getting upset because of the
whole situation."

Less than a month later, they ran into each other again, and had

another tense encounter. They did not see or talk to each other again until the night of
the incident in this case. (Tr., p.377, L.18 - p.384, L.12.)
The encounter giving rise to this case began a little after 2 a.m. when
Mr. Ramirez and his friends ran into Mr. Barrera and his friends at Chronic Taco in
downtown Boise.

(Tr., p.384, L.17 - p.386, L.24, p.677, L.9 - p.678, L.2.)

Both

Mr. Barrera and Mr. Ramirez had spent the preceding several hours drinking at various
establishments in downtown Boise. (Tr., p.429, L.3 - p.435, L.18, p.666, L.8 - p.670,
L.7.) Both men acknowledged engaging in a shouting match, which only ended when
the manager of Chronic Taco threatened to call the police, at which point Mr. Ramirez's
friends pulled him out of the restaurant.

(Tr., p.386, L.16 - p.395, L.2, p.678, L.3 -

p.683, L.5.) As a result of a particularly crude comment made by Mr. Barrera during
that shouting match, his date that night, Margery Jacobsen and a friend of hers, walked

2

References to the transcript volume containing the trial proceedings will be to "Tr."
2

out on him.

(Tr., p.305, L.

p.312, L.17.)

After Mr. Ramirez left, Mr. Barrera

remained in the restaurant for five to ten minutes, with his remaining companions, and
finished his food. (Tr., p.683, Ls.15-22.)
Both men testified that they next encountered each other in the street near a
parking lot not far from Chronic Taco. (Tr., p.399, L.5 - p.400, L.16, p.686, L.6 - p.689,
L.15.) That is where their accounts diverge. According to Mr. Ramirez, he was walking
along when,
I actually, kind of, more or less, brushed up with him.[4] And he said
something to the effect, "She liked it," another just a comment, rude
comment about my ex. And so we get into it, as pretty much standing as I
am right now, in front of him. He's there, he's about 4 feet away from me.
He's going on about, "Okay, let's do this. Let's do this."
And so I'm standing there with my hands apart.
Yeah, because I had a coat on, and I had a shirt.

It's during the winter.

So he lunged out for me. Before he lunged out, I saw him take his coat
off. Took his coat off.[ 5] You could see he was just enraged. Oh, I had
made a comment about - something about his baseball career,[6] you
know, just nudged at him, and so he got mad, for whatever reason at that
[Mr. Ramirez was then asked if he remembered what he had said about
Mr. Barrera's baseball career.]

3

Mr. Ramirez testified that he first spoke with Mr. Barrera when he called him shortly
after learning of the affair. During that call he asked Mr. Barrera to stop seeing his wife
until their divorce became final. (Tr., p.373, L. 18 - p.374, L.10.)
4
Mr. Ramirez's friend of fifteen years, Robert Sanchez, testified that a still-angry
Mr. Ramirez saw Mr. Barrera and said, 'There he is," before bypassing the parking lot
and approaching Mr. Barrera. (Tr., p.521, L.21 - p.524, L.6.) Jeremy McGinnis,
Mr. Barrera's friend, who was acting as the designated driver that night, testified that he
first noticed Mr. Ramirez and his friends when they were 150 feet away. He noticed that
Mr. Ramirez's two friends "were trying to deter him, I guess you could say, from coming
into our direction." (Tr., p.570, L.21 - p.574, L.6.)
5
Mr. Sanchez testified that he did not see Mr. Barrera remove his coat. (Tr., p.523,
Ls.23-25.) Mr. McGinnis testified that he never saw Mr. Barrera take off his coat, and
that Mr. Barrera still had it on when Mr. Ramirez initiated physical contact with
Mr. Barrera by grabbing his jacket. (Tr., p.576, L.16 - p.577, L.3.)
6
Mr. Barrera played collegiate baseball at the University of Utah. (Tr., p.722, Ls.16-20.)

3

Yeah. I think I called him a loser ... [he] didn't make it anywhere. So he
threw his coat off, lunged at me with his right hand, grabbed at my shirt.
He missed the first time, but then he quickly grabbed me by the neck, and
he head-butted me.
(Tr., p.400, L.17- p.401, L.15.)
According to Mr. Barrera, he was walking down the street sending text messages
when one of his friends told him that Mr. Ramirez and his friends were down the street.
He looked up from texting and saw Mr. Ramirez approaching quickly.

Mr. Ramirez

began yelling profanities at him when they were still about twenty feet away from each
other, and that Mr. Ramirez approached him within two feet before they were "in each
other's face[s]," at which time they were both yelling at each other. Mr. Ramirez then
grabbed Mr. Barrera by the neck of his jacket.

Mr. Barrera reacted by grabbing onto

Mr. Ramirez's shirt as a way of "evening things out." Neither of them threw a punch. At
that point, some of the people around got involved, got behind both of them, and tried to
pull them apart. This caused Mr. Barrera to lose his balance. In an attempt to regain
his balance Mr. Barrera tried to pull free of the people pulling him which caused him to
be "ripped away from that force from behind me and ripped forward," the result of which
was that he hit his head on something. 7 (Tr., p.689, L.12 - p.690, L.24.)
Clay Barnes, the emergency room physician who treated Mr. Ramirez, testified
that when a head-butt is executed "[w]ith the right force applied, it can be lifethreatening."8 When asked by the State if "a head-butt is the kind of mechanism that is
likely to cause great bodily harm," Dr. Barnes replied, "Absolutely." (Tr., p.278, Ls.20-25
(emphasis added).) During cross-examination, Dr. Barnes stated that the "mechanism

7

Mr. Barrera explained, on cross-examination, that he assumes that his head hit
Mr. Ramirez's head. (Tr., p.699, Ls.8-16.)
8
Dr. Barnes acknowledged that he has never witnessed a head-butt being executed.
(Tr., p.286, Ls.14-19.)
4

[of a head-butt] has that potential [to cause great bodily injury]." (Tr., p.291, Ls.19-24
(emphasis added).)

On re-direct, Dr. Barnes explained that "[w]ithout seeing the

mechanism of the injury, it's challenging to know" whether Mr. Ramirez experienced a
significant, direct blunt force.

(Tr., p.293, Ls.11-17.) The district court did not allow

Mr. Barrera to call a proffered expert witness on martial arts who would have testified,
inter a/ia, that not all types of head-butts are executed in a manner likely to cause great

bodily injury. (10/5/11 Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.50, L.23.)
Prior to the jury deliberating, Mr. Barrera requested that the jury be instructed
that, in order to be found guilty of aggravated assault, the State was required to prove
that he acted intentionally.

Specifically, defense counsel requested that the word

"intentionally" be inserted before the word "unlawfully" in what were ultimately given as
Instruction Nos. 3, 11, and 12. 9 (Jury Inst. Tr., p.61, L.8-p.62, L.10.) The district court
declined to instruct the jury that Mr. Barrera was required to have any intent, adopting
the State's argument that aggravated assault, as it was charged against Mr. Barrera
was not a specific intent crime. (Jury Inst. Tr., p.62, L.11 - p.63, L.19.)
Ultimately, the jury was instructed on aggravated assault as follows:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aggravated Assault, the state
must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about January 16, 2011[,]

2.

in the state of Idaho,

3.
the defendant Benson Barrera unlawfully attempted, with apparent
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of Juan Carlos Ramirez,
4.

by head-butting the victim, and

9

Instruction No. 3 was a recitation of the language of the charge contained in the
charging instrument. (R., p.282; Tr., p.185, L.21 - p.187, L.2.) Instruction Nos. 11 and
12 were the instructions for aggravated assault and simple assault, respectively.
(R., pp.292-93; Tr., p.779, L.4 - p.780, L.7.)

5

5.
the defendant committed that assault by a means or force likely to
produce great bodily harm.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(R., p.292, Tr., p.779, Ls.4-17.)
During deliberations, the jury asked the following question, "Regarding Instruction
No. 11: To prove aggravated assault, does the state need to show that the defendant
intended to commit an assault likely to produce great bodily harm? In other words, does
the defendant's intent apply to the phrase 'likely to cause great bodily harm'?"

(Jury

Question Tr., p.91, Ls.6-13.) The district court answered the question as follows:
Answer: The criminal intent which is required is the general intent to
wilfully [sic] commit an act the direct, natural and probable consequences
of which if successfully completed would be the injury to another. The
intent to cause any particular injury is not necessary. It is for you to
decide if there was an assault and if it was done by a means or force likely
to produce great bodily harm.
(Juror Question to Judge During Deliberation (augmentation).)
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Barrera guilty of aggravated assault (R., p.308),
and the district court granted him a withheld judgment.

(R., pp.316-17.) Mr. Barrera

filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the entry of the withheld judgment. (R., p.322.)

6

ISSUES

1.

Was the evidence presented sufficient to establish Mr. Barrera's guilt on the
charge of aggravated assault?

2.

Did the district court err when it improperly instructed the jury as to the requisite
mental state for aggravated assault?

3.

Did the district court err when it admitted two irrelevant and prejudicial text
messages over Mr. Barrera's objection?

4.

Did the district court err when it excluded, on relevance grounds, a defense
expert on head-butting?

5.

Is Mr. Barrera entitled to a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine?

6.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, constituting fundamental error in violation
of Mr. Barrera's due process right to a fair trial, when she insulted the function of
defense counsel during closing arguments?

7

ARGUMENT
I.

The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Establish Mr. Barrera's Guilt On The
Charge Of Aggravated Assault

A.

Introduction
Mr. Barrera asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support

a conviction for aggravated assault. At most, the evidence established a simple assault
and / or battery.

As such, this Court should vacate his conviction for aggravated

assault, order that a judgment of acquittal be entered as to that charge, and remand this
matter to the district court for a new trial on any lesser-included charges that the State
wishes to pursue.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for an appellate court regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain a conviction was set forth in State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823
(Ct. App. 1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that:
A conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence upon
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we construe all facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of upholding the
jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to
sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict.

Id. (citations omitted). "For evidence to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho
808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586
(1996)).

8

C.

The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Establish Mr. Barrera's Guilt On
The Charge Of Aggravated Assault
Mr. Barrera was charged with aggravated

assault, in violation of Idaho

Code§§ 18-901 (a) and 905(b), alleged to have been committed as follows:
That the Defendant, BENSON BARRERA, on or about the 15th day of
January 2011, at "Chronic Taco" on 5th Street in Boise, did unlawfully and
with apparent ability, attempt to commit a violent injury upon the person of
Juan Carlos Ramirez by a means likely to produce great bodily harm, towit: by head-butting the victim with force great enough to necessitate
stitches above the victim's left eye.
(R., pp.229-30.)
Idaho Code § 18-905, in relevant part, provides, "An aggravated assault is an
assault ... [b]y any means or force likely to produce great bodily harm." I.C. § 18905(b). Idaho Code § 18-901, in relevant part, provides, "An assault is ... [a]n unlawful
attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
another .... " I.C. § 18-901 (a).
The State presented evidence that Mr. Barrera's head struck Mr. Ramirez's head
during a heated argument. Mr. Ramirez testified that the strike was a willful head-butt.
(Tr., p.401, L.11 - p.407, L.5.) As a result of that strike, Mr. Ramirez sustained a cut to
his eyebrow, necessitating "the equivalent of 7 to 10 stitches."

(Tr., p.283, Ls.1-8.)

According to Clay Barnes, the emergency room physician who treated Mr. Ramirez,
when a head-butt is executed "[w]ith the right force applied, it can be life-threatening."
When asked by the State if "a head-butt is the kind of mechanism that is likely to cause
great bodily harm," Dr. Barnes replied, "Absolutely."

(Tr., p.278, Ls.20-25 (emphasis

added).) During cross-examination, Dr. Barnes stated that the "mechanism [of a headbutt] has that potential [to cause great bodily injury]." (Tr., p.291, Ls.19-24 (emphasis
added).) On re-direct, Dr. Barnes explained that "[w]ithout seeing the mechanism of the
9

injury, it's challenging to know" whether Mr. Ramirez experienced a significant, direct
blunt force. (Tr., p.293, Ls.11-17.)
The State also presented testimony from an ex-girlfriend of Mr. Barrera, to rebut
his testimony that his contact with Mr. Ramirez was accidental.

She testified that he

once told her "that if some dudes ever got brave with him that he would just head-butt
him, and he said they would never see it coming, and you can't defend against it." He
went on to note that "he would just have to be careful that he didn't break the guy's jaw
or anything because he didn't want it to be a felony. He was fine with a misdemeanor,
but he didn't want a felony." (Tr., p.756, L.14 - p.757, L.1.)
Dr. Barnes' testimony concerning the potential for injury from a generic head-butt
was not sufficient to establish that the head-butt alleged to have been executed in this
case was the type that was likely to cause great bodily harm. He acknowledged that the
"mechanism" of a head-butt "has the potential" to cause great bodily harm, and that
when a head-butt is executed "[w]ith the right force applied, it can be life-threatening."
Dr. Barnes also testified that "[w]ithout seeing the mechanism of the injury, it's
challenging to know" whether it resulted from significant direct blunt force.

It is

important to note that Dr. Barnes was not asked whether the means alleged in this
case, a head-butt executed "with force great enough to necessitate stitches above the
victim's left eye," was likely to cause great bodily harm.
Dr. Barnes' testimony can hardly be said to represent substantial competent
evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the head-butt purportedly
executed by Mr. Barrera constituted "a means likely to produce great bodily harm .... "
When coupled with the State's evidence that Mr. Barrera purportedly planned to
execute any such head-butt carefully enough not to cause the type of injury that would
10

constitute a felony it can hardly be said that the State presented sufficient competent
evidence to support the jury's finding that the head-butt in this case was a means likely
to cause great bodily harm. It is worth nothing that the State has previously argued that
conduct that included head-butting "did not rise to the level of an aggravated assault or
other heinous conduct as required by Section 19-202A[1°] .... " See State v. McNeil,
141 Idaho 383, 384-85 (Ct. App. 2005).
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Barrera asserts that the State did not
present substantial competent evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict as to the
aggravated assault charge. As such, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
withheld judgment, order that a judgment of acquittal be entered on the charge, and
remand this matter to the district court for the State to elect whether to pursue the
lesser-included charges of simple assault and/ or battery.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Improperly Instructed The Jury As To The Requisite
Mental State For Aggravated Assault
A.

Introduction
Mr. Barrera asserts that the district court erred when it improperly instructed the

jury as to the requisite mental state for aggravated assault in response to a jury
question. Because the district court's answer to the jury's question lessened the State's
burden of proof and violated Mr. Barrera's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

10

Idaho Code§ 19-202A provides immunity from prosecution for any person who uses
"reasonable means" to protect himself or another "whom he reasonably believes to be in
imminent danger of or the victim of aggravated assault, robbery, rape, murder or other
heinous crime." I.C. § 19-202A.
11

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which Idaho

appellate courts exercise free review. Such a review requires an examination of the jury
instructions as a whole because "[a]n erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible
error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v.

Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88 (2011) (citations omitted).

Jury instructions which

include an improper instruction on an element of the offense violate the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Improperly Instructed The Jury As To The
Requisite Mental State For Aggravated Assault
Mr. Barrera requested that the jury be instructed that, in order to be found guilty

of aggravated assault, the State was required to establish that he acted with the intent
to cause injury to Mr. Ramirez. Specifically, defense counsel requested that the word
"intentionally" be inserted before the word "unlawfully" in what were ultimately given as
Instruction Nos. 3, 11, and 12. 11

(Jury Inst. Tr., p.61, L.8 - p.62, L.10.) The district

court declined to instruct the jury that Mr. Barrera was required to have such an intent,
relying on the State's argument that aggravated assault, as it was charged against
Mr. Barrera was not a specific intent crime. (Jury Inst. Tr., p.62, L.11 - p.63, L.19.)
Initially the jury was instructed on aggravated assault as follows:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aggravated Assault, the state
must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about January 16, 2011 [,]

11

Instruction No. 3 contained the language of the charge taken from the Amended
Information (R., p.282; Tr., p.185, L.21 - p.187, L.2.) Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 were
the instructions for aggravated assault and simple assault, respectively. (R., pp.292-93;
Tr., p.779, L.4 - p.780, L.7.)
12

2.

in the state of Idaho,

3.
the defendant Benson Barrera unlawfully attempted, with apparent
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of Juan Carlos Ramirez,
4.

by head-butting the victim, and

5.
the defendant committed that assault by a means or force likely to
produce great bodily harm.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(R., p.292, Tr., p.779, Ls.4-17.)

During deliberations, the jury submitted the following question, "Regarding
Instruction No. 11: To prove aggravated assault, does the state need to show that the
defendant intended to commit an assault likely to produce great bodily harm? In other
words, does the defendant's intent apply to the phrase 'likely to cause great bodily
harm'?" (Jury Question Tr., p.91, Ls.6-13.) Defense counsel objected to answering the
jury's question. (Jury Question Tr., p.92, L.8

p.97, L.24.) Ultimately, the district court

answered the question as follows:
Answer: The criminal intent which is required is the general intent to
wilfully [sic] commit an act the direct, natural and probable consequences
of which if successfully completed would be the injury to another. The
intent to cause any particular injury is not necessary. It is for you to
decide if there was an assault and if it was done by a means or force likely
to produce great bodily harm.
(Juror Question to Judge During Deliberation (augmentation).)
The language used by the district court was taken from State v. Bonaparte, 114
Idaho 577 (Ct. App. 1988).

Bonaparte concerned whether a defendant should have

been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated assault based on his claim that
he was not informed that the offense required proof of a specific intent In describing
the elements necessary to establish an aggravated assault, the Court noted that
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specific intent to cause great bodily harm was not necessary, and "when entering his
plea, Bonaparte need only have understood that the state was required to prove he
intended to cause harm when firing his rifle . . . . "

(emphasis added).

Bonaparte, 114 Idaho at 580

In Mr. Barrera's case, rather than expressing this practical

application of the Court's holding in a jury instruction, the district court chose to read a
an instruction based on material from a California case quoted in Bonaparte, in which
the California Supreme Court explained,
"We conclude that the criminal intent which is required ... is the general
intent to wilfully [sic] commit an act the direct, natural and probable
consequences of which if successfully completed would be the injury to
another ... The intent to cause any particular injury, to severely injure
another, or to injury in the sense of inflicting bodily harm is not necessary."
Id. (quoting People v. Rocha, 479 P.2d 372, 376-77 (Cal. 1971) (internal citations

omitted).
The difference between the language of the Court's holding in Bonaparte and the
California Supreme Court's quoted holding in Rocha is obvious: in Bonaparte, the Court
concluded that the State was required to prove an intent to cause harm, while in Rocha,
the Court concluded that "[t]he intent to cause ... injury in the sense of inflicting bodily
harm is not necessary." By subtly removing the requirement that the State establish
that, in order to be guilty of aggravated assault (or simple assault, for that matter),
Mr. Barrera intended to cause some injury to Mr. Ramirez, not necessarily great bodily
harm, the district court relieved the State of proof of the requisite mental state of the
offense.
In a case involving a similar initial instruction, State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663
(Ct. App. 2004), the Court considered whether the jury was properly instructed as to the
intent required for aggravated assault.

Ultimately, the Court accepted the State's
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argument that the word "attempted" incorporated the intent to cause an injury,
concluding,
[T]he jury was instructed that Broadhead made an effort to do, accomplish
or effect a violent injury upon the three boys. We can discern no
possibility of this being interpreted as anything other than an intentional
act upon the part of Broadhead. Therefore, the jury was properly
instructed to find an element of intentional action, and the jury instruction
was not erroneous.
Broadhead, 139 Idaho at 666-67.

While the jury in Mr. Barrera's case was initially

instructed consistently with what the Court found acceptable in Broadhead, which
implied, through the word "attempted," the necessity of proof of an intent to cause injury,
the later instruction, in response to the jury's question, eliminated this implication, and
improperly informed the jury that it could convict Mr. Barrera in the absence of any
intent to cause injury.

As such, even assuming that the instruction in Broadhead, a

version of which was initially given in this case, is an accurate statement of the law, 12
the district court's response to the jury question modified the instruction to remove the
requisite mental state, thereby lightening the State's burden of proof in violation of
Mr. Barrera's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

111.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Two Irrelevant And Prejudicial Text
Messages Over Mr. Barrera's Objection
A.

Introduction
Mr. Barrera asserts that the district court erred when it admitted two text

messages that he sent to Ms. Ramirez, shortly before the altercation with Mr. Ramirez,

12

The Court of Appeals has, in dicta, questioned whether the holding in Bonaparte, that
no specific intent to cause serious bodily injury is required to be proven to establish an
aggravated assault, and asked the Idaho Supreme Court to provide "[c]larfication" on
the question. See State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 46-47 (Ct. App. 2000).
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because they were irrelevant, and assuming, arguendo, that they were minimally
relevant, they were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 and constituted impermissible
character evidence in violation of Rule 404.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Admitted Two Irrelevant And Prejudicial Text
Messages Over Mr. Barrera's Objection
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404, in relevant part, provides:
(a) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same

(b) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution
in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
I.RE. 404.

Evidence that is offered under Rule 404 is subject to the balancing test

enumerated in Rule 403. I.RE. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... ");
see also State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588 (Ct. App. 1991 ).

The State sought to introduce what it classified as 404(b) evidence consisting of
text messages sent by Mr. Barrera to Ms. Ramirez in the hours preceding the incident in
this case.

(R, pp.105-08.)

There were six messages in total, admitted as State's

Exhibit Nos. 6 to 11, only three of which were objected to by defense counsel.
(Tr., p.220, L.20 - p.221, L.5, p.228, Ls.19-20.) Of those three, Mr. Barrera only claims
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error in the admission of two of the messages. The two messages to which he assigns
error were admitted as State's Exhibit Nos. 10 and 11. State's Exhibit No. 10 reads,
"You blow," and State's Exhibit I\Jo. 11 reads, "Want to fuck?" 13 (State's Exhibit Nos. 10
and 11.)
Initially, the State argued that State's Exhibit No. 11 was relevant because it
represents "the state's theory of the case" which is that Mr. Barrera is "the alpha male
that gets the woman and commits acts of violence." The district court inquired as to
how a message directed toward Ms. Ramirez that did not mention her ex-husband had
anything to do with Mr. Barrera's attitude about Mr. Ramirez. The State explained that
Mr. Barrera's "thinking to the victim in this case is inseparable from his thinking towards
her [Ms. Ramirez]," before explaining that it was relevant because Mr. Barrera was out
on a date at the time that he sent the text message, and that minutes after the
altercation, he sent a text message to his date saying, "Well I'm really sorry about that.
Will you come home with me?" According to the State, "He's the alpha male.

He's

trying to have sex 20 minutes before he head-butts Carlos. He head-butts Carlos. He's
trying to have sex 10 minutes afterwards. It's all part of who he is." (Tr., p.228, L.25 p.230, L.6.)
Defense counsel responded by noting, "[T]his is exactly the character zone
where we were l1eaded to. This alpha male thing is an attempt to characterize my client
as a violent, nasty, vile, filthy fellow, and it has nothing to do, and has no probative
value, on what happened in the parking lot between these two gentlemen." Defense

13

The State specifically referenced the "You blow" and "Want to fuck?" text messages
in its 404(b) notice. (R., p.106 n.2.)

17

counsel closed by explaining that State's Exhibit No. 11 was "the first round in that
attempted character assassination." (Tr., p.230, Ls.14-21.)
The State responded to the character evidence argument by arguing that it was
"not character evidence" because "these are the facts of the case . . . Character
evidence is, this is what he did last week, the week before."

(Tr., p.231, Ls.14-17.)

Without addressing the character evidence argument, the district court sustained
defense counsel's objections to State's Exhibit Nos. 10 and 11, noting that, even if they
were relevant, "the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value." (Tr., p.233, Ls.6-9.)
During the State's cross-examination of Mr. Barrera, the State again sought to
introduce State's Exhibit Nos. 10 and 11. Defense counsel again objected, arguing that
the exhibits were not relevant "and violative of the character prohibitions," and that
State's Exhibit No. 11 was "extremely prejudicial" because it "suggest[s] ... that my
client is a womanizer and is carrying on with two women, simultaneously
(Tr., p.729, L.19 - p.731, L.3.) The State responded by arguing,
I'm not offering these texts to show that he's a womanizer. I don't
think he was trying to have sex with Scarlet Ramirez that night. I,
certainly, wouldn't argue that; that's not the purpose. The purpose is to
show that he has Carlos on his mind, and he's the one that persists. He
keeps after it. He blames Carlos for what happened, but nobody's texting
him. Defense counsel argues there were no texts from Scarlet Ramirez in
response. That is exactly the point. No one is texting him, but he keeps
after it.
I don't think that there is any prejudicial value that is unfair, which is
the test under 403, the danger of unfair prejudice. I certainly think it's
prejudicial, but there's nothing unfair about it ....
(Tr., p.732, L.24-p.733, L.12.)
The district court ultimately ruled that the exhibits could be admitted, explaining,
So it goes to his credibility. I mean, he's telling the jurors, you
know, I want to hang out with Margery [the woman with whom he was on a
date]. I want to be with her, and at the same time he's texting somebody
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else. So there's some - there's a credibility issue there as well. And so
the text to Margery has a tendency to impeach, you know, his credibility.
From the state's point of view, the defendant's state of mind, they
also want to show by this that he - in the text that he texted to
Ms. Ramirez was that he did have Carlos on his mind. I mean the state's
theory of the case is Mr. Barrera was the instigator, at least I think so. I
don't want to mischaracterize what the state's case is.
So as this case has progressed, you know my initial ruling was that
I felt that the prejudicial nature of it outruled [sic] any relevancy. But as
this case progressed, then I find, you know, based on all the testimony I've
heard up to date, that Exhibits 10 and 11, I believe, become more
relevant
They're more relevant in terms of also corroboration of
Mr. Ramirez' testimony about the relationship between the defendant and
his ex-wife.
(Tr., p.734, L.25

p.735, L.22.)

The district court's analysis is flawed for a number of reasons, not the least of
which is that it failed to consider the 404(a)(1) claim. Defense counsel argued that the
exhibits were the sort of character evidence that was not permitted to be offered under
the Rules of Evidence. The State argued, initially, that the texts proved that Mr. Barrera
was "the alpha male that gets the woman and commits acts of violence." (Tr., p.229,
Ls.4-5.) The State also argued that the texts were relevant to show that Mr. Barrera
was trying to have sex with two different women in the minutes before and after the
incident, which is "all part of who he is." (Tr., p.230, Ls.3-6.) The State later argued that
the exhibits demonstrate that he "persists" and "keeps after it" in contacting
Ms. Ramirez and they show that "[hJe blames Carlos for what happened." (Tr., p.733,
Ls.2-8.)

Under Rule 404(a)(1 ), the State is not permitted to introduce evidence of a

pertinent character trait of a defendant except to rebut a claim about such a character
trait made by the defendant. I.RE. 404(a)(1 ).
Mr. Barrera did not put a trait of his character at issue, let alone make the
assertion that he was a good boyfriend rather than a cad. In fact, he candidly testified
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that the reason that his date left during the initial confrontation at Chronic Taco was
because, during the shouting match with Mr. Ramirez, he said, '"You're mad because
we tag-teamed your ex-wife' or something like that."

(Tr., p.708, Ls.9-14.)

He also

testified that Mr. Ramirez's mention of the affair with Ms. Ramirez in front of his date
caused him to be "embarrassed ... that I had broken his home." (Tr., p.681, Ls.1-6.)
The remaining problems are that, assuming it was not character evidence
prohibited under 404(a)(1 ), the evidence was not relevant for any of the reasons stated
by the district court, and even assuming, arguendo, that they were minimally relevant,
any such relevance was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice in admitting the
exhibits. Specifically, the district court found the statements were relevant to impeach
Mr. Barrera's testimony regarding his romantic intentions with his date that night, and to
corroborate Mr. Ramirez's testimony as to the nature of the relationship between
Mr. Barrera and his ex-wife.
With respect to the relationship corroboration finding, it is worth considering the
language of Rule 401, which describes relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."

I.RE. 401. The testimony in this case makes it clear that the nature of Mr. Barrera's
affair with Ms. Ramirez was neither in dispute nor a fact of consequence to the case.
(Tr., p.215, L.1 - p.217, L.25 (Ms. Ramirez testifying concerning the affair); p.371, L.2 p.372, L.3 (Mr. Ramirez testifying that his wife acknowledged a relationship with
someone who he later learned was Mr. Barrera, but that he didn't "know the exact
details" because he "didn't want to know any more"); p.681, Ls.1-6 (Mr. Barrera
acknowledging his embarrassment at his role in causing the break-up of Mr. Ramirez's
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marriage); p.708, Ls.9-14 (Mr. Barrera acknowledging that he told Mr. Ramirez that he
and a friend had together had sex with his wife).)
With respect to impeaching Mr. Barrera's testimony concerning his intentions
toward his date that night, even assuming that State's Exhibit No. 11 did that, it, too,
was not relevant to a fact at issue in the case. It was the very sort of other act character
evidence that is not admissible under Rule 404. See State v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17, 19
(Ct. App. 1990) (Rule 404 represents a "general prohibition against using specific acts
to show character").

Even assuming that evidence that a person is attempting to be

sexually-promiscuous by pursuing simultaneous sexual relationships with more than
one person, it is unclear why that person's attempt to pursue two women at the same
time, while none of the parties is married and with no evidence that the pursuer was
misleading the women about being in a monogamous relationship, could be considered
evidence relevant to that person's credibility.
Furthermore, even assuming it was somehow minimally relevant, any such
relevance was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. In State v. Clay,
112 Idaho 261, 270 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeals considered the use of prior
act evidence in a rape trial where the only issue in dispute was whether the sex was
consensual. The prior act evidence was that the defendant made aggressive "passes"
at several women shortly before the alleged rape of a different woman.

Although the

conviction was reversed and remanded on other grounds, the Court addressed the
potential reintroduction of the prior act evidence on remand. In offering guidance to the
district court, the Court "caution[ed] the trial judge that the evidence should not be
admitted unless the prosecutor makes a stronger showing of probative value than the
present record contains." Id. at 269-70. The Court explained that such evidence "would
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contribute negligibly to an understanding of whether" the sex was consensual or
forcible, and that "[c]onversely, the evidence would carry a high risk of unfair prejudice,
portraying [him] as an undesirable character - a married man crudely seeking sexual
liaisons with other women." Id. Similar to the facts of Clay, even if the evidence that
Mr. Barrera was romantically-interested in more than one woman at the same time was
marginally relevant, any such relevance carried a high risk of prejudice of showing that
he is a cad and not a good person. State's Exhibit No. 10 consisted of nothing more
than a crude insult directed at Ms. Ramirez, and serves only to show that Mr. Barrera is
a person who insults women with whom he disagrees.
Finally, with respect to the district court's finding that the two text messc1ges show
Mr. Barrera's attitude toward Mr. Ramirez, Mr. Barrera notes that, even assuming that
the two messages were relevant in that regard, their value was substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. This is especially true in light of the fact that the State
was able to introduce, without objection, several other text messages that clearly
showed Mr. Barrera's feelings toward Mr. Ramirez. Those text messages, admitted as
State's Exhibit Nos. 6, 7, and 8, all include insults about Mr. Ramirez, including claims
that indicate that he is small and would not fare well in a physical confrontation with
Mr. Barrera and his friends.

(State's Exhibit Nos. 6, 7, and 8.)

Given the wealth of

alternative evidence for establishing Mr. Barrera's feelings toward Mr. Ramirez, and the
at-best minimally relevant nature of the objected-to messages, any relevance was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that admitting such exhibits
entailed, and should have been excluded under Rule 403.
In short, the two exhibits offered over Mr. Barrera's objection were not relevant,
represented impermissible character evidence, and even if they were minimally
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relevant, any such relevance was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to Mr. Barrera. Given the fact that the error was objected to, and the he-said,
he-said nature of the case, it will be impossible for the State to establish that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in order to avoid reversal.

As such,

1\11r. Barrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate the withheld judgment and
remand this matter for a new trial at which such evidence will not be admitted.

IV.
The District Court Erred When It Excluded, On Relevance Grounds, A Defense Expert
On Head-Butting

A

Introduction
Mr. Barrera asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that the

testimony of a proffered defense expert was not relevant and violated his Sixth
Amendment right to call witnesses on his behalf and present a defense when it
prevented him from calling that witness to testify as to the mechanics of head-butting
and what types of head-butts are likely to cause great bodily harm.

Because the

proffered testimony was relevant to a fact of consequence at issue in this case, the
district court's refusal to allow Mr. Barrera to call his expert witness was erroneous and
deprived him of his Sixth Amendment rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho

816, 819 (Ct. App. 1993). The standard of review on issues of relevance is de nova.
State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 218 (2000) (citations omitted).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Excluded, On Relevance Grounds, A Defense
Expert On Head-Butting
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
I.R.E. 401. Idaho Rule of Evidence 402 provides, "All relevant evidence is admissible
except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of
this state." I.R.E. 402.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence

"may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I.R.E.
403.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part,
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. AIVIEND. VI. "The
Compulsory Process Clause grants a criminal defendant the right to call witnesses that
are 'material and favorable to his defense."' Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 324-25 (6th
Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Valnezue/a-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
"[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish
rules excluding evidence from criminal trial. Such rules do not abridge an accused's
right to present a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve."' United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308
(1998) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987)).
The State moved to exclude the testimony of Dan Embree, a proffered defense
witness who is an expert in martial arts.
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The State took issue with Mr. Embree's

qualifications, and argued that his testimony "will not aid the trier of fact" and "will
confuse the issues."

(R., pp.183-85.)

At a hearing on the State's motion, defense

counsel provided an offer of proof regarding Mr. Embree's testimony, explaining,
And what this man will testify to, Judge - I want to be very clear
about this - is this is head-butting by a means likely to produce great
bodily harm, not his expertise and is drawn for mixed martial arts; I'm not
trying to give the jury lessons in mixed martial arts; I'm trying to tell the jury
how a head-butt is administered by a means likely to produce great bodily
harm, and we certify to the court that that's a critical issue in this case
solely because that's how the prosecutor has charged this information.
(10/5/11 Tr., p.43, L.18 - p.44, L.2 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel argued that
the testimony was crucial to establish that not all head-butts are of the type that are
likely to cause great bodily harm, and to demonstrate the type of head-butt, the means,
that could cause such harm. (10/5/11 Tr., p.38, L.4-p.39, L.17.)
The district court recognized and articulated defense counsel's argument when,
in responding to the State's argument that the defense should not be allowed to call an
expert on head-butting if the defense maintained its position that no head-butt occurred,
it explained that it believed the evidence was being offered "to refute your evidence.
Your evidence is - so even though his evidence is that he didn't do it, but he's going to
try to refute the state's evidence that a head-butt is not a means likely to produce great
bodily harm." (10/5/11 Tr., p.46, L.16 - p.47, L.2.)
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the testimony was irrelevant and
would only serve to confuse the jury, reasoning,
[T]he question is whether or not Mr. Emerey [sic] would assist the
trier of fact or only confuse them, and I think his testimony would be would confuse the jury. Mr. Emerey's [sic] expertise is in martial arts.
This is not what we have here. We have basically two lay people having a
heated argument and a head-butt, but it was not. They're not alleging in
the sense of it was a martial arts type maneuver or what, and that it's
something - and there is no evidence that I have that the defendant
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understood at the time of this incident that - how to head-butt in martial
arts.
Like I said, I think that would be relevant if he was a martial arts
person who had taken training in that, then maybe it becomes relevant,
Mr. Emerey's [sic], but I do not - I do think that it would simply confuse the
jury.
So Mr. Emerey [sic] is denied.
(10/5/11 Tr., p.50, Ls.5-23.)
The district court erred when it concluded that Mr. Embree's proposed testimony
concerning the mechanics of head-butts and what types of head-butts are likely to
cause

great

bodily

harm

was

irrelevant,

and

appears

misunderstanding of the nature of the proffered testimony.

to

be

based

on

its

Nothing in defense

counsel's offer of proof indicated that Mr. Embree's testimony would be limited to headbutts that were only executed by those trained in martial arts.
Mr. Embree's testimony concerning the types of head-butts that are likely to
cause great bodily harm and the types that are not likely to do so was central to the
question of guilt in this case.

The State was required to prove that Mr. Barrera

employed "a means likely to produce great bodily harm, to-wit: by head-butting the
victim with force great enough to necessitate stitches above the victim's left eye."
(R., p.230.)

Consistent with this requirement, the State elicited testimony from

Dr. Barnes, the emergency room physician who treated Mr. Ramirez and who has never
witnessed a head-butt, that a head-butt was likely to produce great bodily harm.
(Tr., p.278, Ls.20-25, p.286, Ls.14-19.)

Whether the means employed, a head-butt

executed "with force great enough to necessitate stitches above the victim's left eye.''
was or wasn't likely to produce great bodily harm was a crucial issue in this case, and
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failure to allow material and favorable testimony on the issue deprived Mr. Barrera of his
Sixth Amendment rights.
To the extent that the district court's statement concerning confusing the jury
could be construed as an alternative basis for exclusion, Mr. Barrera notes that
Mr. Embree's testimony was a natural counterpoint to Dr. Barnes' testimony on the
same issue.
In light of Dr. Barnes' testimony on the same issue, the language of the charging
instrument, and the he-said, he-said nature of the State's case, Mr. Barrera asserts that
the error in excluding Mr. Embree's testimony in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights
cannot be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

As such,

Mr. Barrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate the withheld judgment and
remand this matter for a new trial at which such evidence may be presented.

V.
Mr. Barrera Is Entitled To A New Trial Under The Cumulative Error Doctrine
Assuming that this Court finds the errors set forth in sections II, 111, and IV, to
have been individually harmless, Mr. Barrera asserts that, together, the errors amount
to cumulative error.

Under the cumulative error doctrine, even when individual errors

are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of his
constitutional due process right to a fair trial.
(1994).

State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453

In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is

merit to more than one of the claims of error before determining whether these errors,
when aggregated, denied Mr. Barrera a fair trial. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171
(Ct. App. 1999).
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Based on the fact that more than one error occurred in his trial, the doctrine of
cumulative error can be applied, and, in light of the nature of, and weaknesses in, the
State's case reversal of the withheld judgment with a new trial is warranted.

The

argument and authority in support of the asserted errors are set forth in sections II, 111,
and IV, supra, and are incorporated herein by reference.

VI.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Constituting Fundamental Error In Violation Of
Mr. Barrera's Due Process Right To A Fair Trial, When She Insulted The Function Of
Defense Counsel During Closing Argument
A.

Introduction
Mr. Barrera asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct, constituting

fundamental error in violation of his due process right to a fair trial, when she insulted
the function of defense counsel during closing argument. Specifically, she said, "After
defense counsel's remarks to you, my concern is that you are going to be disoriented
That you are going to be confused, because that's part of his job, about what you're
supposed to do here."

(Tr., p.818, Ls.11-15.)

Because the misconduct was not

objected to by defense counsel, Mr. Barrera must satisfy the three-prong test
announced by this Court in State v. Perry.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for unobjected to error as set forth by the Idaho Supreme

Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), is as follows:
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: ( 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the
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defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and
remand.

Id.

C.

228.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, In Violation Of Mr. Barrera's Due
Process Right To A Fair Trial, When She Insulted The Function Of Defense
Counsel During Closing Argument
In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court explained,
Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than
the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.

Mr. Barrera asserts that the prosecutor's unobjected-to comments, in which she
attacked defense counsel and the role of defense counsel in our system of justice
represented an attempt to secure a verdict on a factor other than the law and evidence,
thereby violating his due process right to a fair trial, as recognized in Perry.

This

satisfies the first prong of Perry.
With respect to the second prong of Perry, whether the error was plain,
Mr. Barrera notes that the challenged statements made by the prosecutor in this case
were clearly inappropriate under Idaho law. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly
announced that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to disparage or make personal attacks
on defense counsel.

See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003) ("[l]t is

misconduct for the prosecution to make personal attacks on defense counsel in closing
argument.") (citations omitted); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000) ("It is
misconduct for a prosecutor to disparage a defense attorney in closing argument.")
(citing State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 656 (Ct. App. 1984)). In Baruth, the Idaho Court
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of Appeals concluded that it was misconduct for a prosecutor to make statements that
"had the effect - if not the intent - to disparage" defense counsel. It concluded that the
statements "unfairly case the role of a defendant's counsel ... [and] were improper."
One of the statements made by the prosecutor in that case was that "doubt is a defense
attorney's stock and trade. They are going to market it, package it, and huckster it to
the first juror in the box until the last word is out of their mouth." Baruth, 107 Idaho at
657. The statements in this case similarly disparaged defense counsel and the role of
defense counsel in our system of justice.
With respect to the third prong of Perry, whether the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, Mr. Barrera asserts that the misconduct in this case was
particularly damaging because he makes his living as a criminal defense attorney, as
was highlighted in the State's cross-examination of him, illustrated in the following
exchange:
Q. You're a pretty smart guy?

A. I think so.
Q. You graduated from law school with honors?

A. Yes.

Q. You referred to being a defense attorney. I guess, how many years did
you work as a defense attorney?

A. I worked in civil for one year out of law school, and then I've been a
defense attorney for five.
Q. Criminal defense attorney?

A. Correct.
Q. So you're used to being in the courtroom?
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A. Yes.
Q. And you're used to appearing in front of juries?

A. I probably try a case once every few months.

(Tr., p.713, L.15 - p.715, L.1.) Therefore, the

inappropriate comment not only

demeaned both defense counsel in this case and the role of defense counsel in our
system, it also personally demeaned Mr. Barrera on the basis of his profession. In light
of this and considering the he-said, he-said nature of the case against Mr. Barrera, he
asserts he has demonstrated that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Mr. Barrera asserts that because he has established fundamental error under all
three prongs of Perry, this Court should vacate the withheld judgment and remand this
matter for a new trial at which the State behaves ethically and does not violate
Mr. Barrera's due process right to a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Barrera respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the withheld judgment and remand this matter for entry of a judgment of acquittal
on the charge of aggravated battery. In the alternative, if this Court finds the evidence
presented was sufficient to support the jury's finding, he respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the withheld judgment and remand this matter for a new trial free of the
prejudicial error present at his first trial.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2013.

SPENGERJ.HAHN
Deput/State Appellate Public Defender
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